Trust · for security and compliance review

What breaks, what it reaches, and for how long.

Answers to the questions a committee will ask in a meeting we are not in. Written down so they can be quoted back to us.

The accountability chain

Every action resolves to a named human, because every chain roots in a grant a person issued.

Failure modes

A credential leaks. What does it reach, and for how long?

Exactly the scopes and limits written into that grant, and no more — an attacker holding it cannot widen it, because widening fails the attenuation check at the verifier. Reach is bounded by the grant, not by the breach.

bound: min(expiry across chain) · currently ≤ 7 days by policy, not by code

You revoke. How fast does it propagate?

Immediately for any counterparty that resolves at use time. For one that cached an assertion, not at all yet — they hold a valid signature until it expires. This is the largest open gap in the model and it is why expiries are short.

gap: cross-org propagation not built · planned Q1 2027

The signing key is compromised. Then what?

Every assertion signed by that kid becomes untrustworthy at once. Rotation publishes a new kid to the JWKS and removes the old one; verifiers that follow the spec fail closed on an unknown kid. There is no key escrow and no offline recovery path.

bound: one active kid · rotation is manual, no automated schedule

What can an agent commit the organization to?

Nothing that requires contract.sign, because that scope is reserved and no grant issues it today. Agents propose. A named human signs. That is a design position, not a temporary limitation.

bound: contract.sign reserved, unissued

What happens if flashyid.com is unreachable?

Verification fails closed for any party without a cached JWKS. The keys are cacheable for an hour and stale-while-revalidate for a day, so a counterparty who has fetched recently continues to verify. A first-time verifier cannot.

bound: no multi-region JWKS · single origin

What is not in place

Dated, and updated when the code changes rather than when the page is redesigned. A blank security page reads as a company that has not thought about it.

SOC 2 Type IInot startedNot held
Third-party penetration testnot scheduledNot done
Independent cryptographic review of the profiletarget Q4 2026Planned
Formal key rotation schedule and runbooktarget Q4 2026Planned
Published incident response processtarget Q4 2026Planned
Signing key in an HSMcurrently in a managed secret storeNot held
Public JWKS, unauthenticated, cachedlive since 2026-08-19Live
Per-org isolation, role-gated resolutionin productionLive

Measured against FlashyLabs/flashyos at ba975ec · 19 Aug 2026. No certification is claimed on this page that is not held.

Status

Building · instrumented 2026-08-19

Two surfaces are checked from outside our own network. There is no uptime history to show yet, and a status page reporting 100% on its first day is not a claim — it is an absence of data, labelled as one.

/.well-known/jwks.jsonchecked from 3 regionsReachable
verifier · browser pathsynthetic, every 5 minReachable
uptime historyinstrumented 2026-08-19No data
incident logno incidents recordedNo history
multi-region JWKSsingle origin todayNot built
Where authority ends by construction

An agent cannot widen its own grant, cannot extend its own expiry, and cannot mint a child that exceeds itself — not because policy forbids it but because a verifier that accepted such a chain would fail its own attenuation check. Everything else on this page is policy, and policy can be misconfigured.